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URBAN LEGENDS, DESEGREGATION AND SCHOOL
FINANCE: DID KANSAS CITY REALLY PROVE THAT
MONEY DOESN'T MATTER?
Preston C. Green, III*
Bruce D. Baker**
This Article examines whether conservative critics are correct in their assertion that
the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) desegregation plan clearly
establishes that no correlation exists between funding and academic outcomes. The
first section provides a summary of public education in KCMSD prior to 1977, the
beginning of the Missouri v. Jenkins school desegregation litigation. The second
and third sections analyze whether the Jenkins desegregation and concurrent school
finance litigation (Committee for Educational Equality v. State) addressed
these problems. The fourth section provides an overview of school finance litigation
and explains how KCMSD desegregation plan has been cited as proof by
conservatives that no correlation exists between educational outcomes and academic
performance. The final section uses national and state level data on school funding
and student outcomes to determine whether their assertions are correct.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960s, plaintiffs have challenged the legality of school
finance formulas in 45 states.' A number of courts that have invalidated
their school finance systems did so after finding a correlation between
educational funding and academic outcomes.2 Conservative critics have
countered that Missouri v. Jenkins, a series of school desegregation cases
involving the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD), proves
that no such correlation exists. For example, a Wall Street Journal editorial
explained the application of the Jenkins case to school finance litigation in
the following manner:
Over the past two decades, courts in more than 30 states have
intervened in education policy and ordered billions of dollars
spent on schools in the name of boosting student performance
and ensuring equitable financing. The result has been an ava-
lanche of new spending on inner city and rural schools, but,
alas, not much measurable achievement by the kids who were
supposed to be helped.
In one of the most notorious cases, in Kansas City, Missouri in
the 1980s, a judge issued an edict requiring a $1 billion tax
hike to help the failing inner-city schools. This raised expendi-
tures to about $14,000 per student, or double the national
1. Molly A Hunter, Litigation, NATIoNAL ACCESs NErWORK, at http://
www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
2. See e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326,340-44 (N.Y 2003).
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average, but test scores continued to decline. Even the judge
later admitted that he had blundered?
This Article examines whether the KCMSD desegregation plan
proves that there is no correlation between funding and academic out-
comes. The first section of the Article summarizes public education in
KCMSD. Specifically, we identify the organizational and funding prob-
lems that had a negative impact on the school district prior to 1977: the
beginning of the Jenkins litigation. The second and third sections analyze
whether the Jenkins desegregation and the concurrent school finance liti-
gation initiatives addressed these problems.
The fourth section offers an overview of school finance litigation
and explains how conservatives have relied on the KCMSD desegregation
plan to prove that no correlation exists between educational outcomes
and academic performance.We also examine the three premises conserva-
tives have based their critiques: (1) KCMSD received more money than
any other school district over an extended period; (2) because the exorbi-
tant spending on KCMSD did not lead to improvement in educational
outcomes, the plan serves as a cautionary tale for why spending large sums
on predominantly black schools is non-productive and inefficient; and
(3) the state of Missouri covered a disproportionate share of the costs of
the desegregation plan, to the detriment of the rest of state's school dis-
tricts. The Article's final section examines national and state level data on
school funding and student outcomes to determine whether these con-
servative premises are correct.
I. AN OVERVIEW Or EDUCATION IN KCMSD PRIOR TO
MISSOURI VJENKINS AND COMMITTEE
FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY
A. Lay of the Land
KCMSD is carved out of a two-state metropolitan area. Using
demographic as well as county, place and school district boundary data
from the 2000 U.S. Census, Figure 1 presents a geographic view of the
Missouri side of the Kansas City metropolitan area. Kansas City, Missouri
is located in two counties north and south of the Missouri river.The cen-
ter city and downtown areas are in Jackson County, south of the river. In
the region south of the river, several school districts are carved partly and
in some cases, entirely outside of the city limits. Those districts include
KCMSD, Center School District, Raytown (partially), Grandview (par-
tially), Hickman Mills and Lee's Summit (overlapping a small corner of
the city). KCMSD also overlaps a portion of the city of Independence
3. Editorial, Texas School Lesson, WALL ST.J., Nov. 29,2005, at A18.
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(Northeast corner of KCMSD). Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that peo-
ple living in the core of Kansas City, Missouri (identified by zip code) are
over 90% black. Thus, despite the end of de jure segregation, many areas
are still de facto segregated.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not include Kansas zip codes adjacent to
the west of Kansas City and Center school districts. Since the 1960s, these
areas have been the most segregated-white only-zip codes in the met-
ropolitan area.
FIGURE I
SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE KANSAS CITY METROPOLITAN AREA
School Districts & Incorporated Places
Urban Legends, Desegregation and School Finance
School Districts & % Black
by Zip Code
In 2000, KCMSD remained approximately 70% black, but the resi-
dent population within KCMSD boundaries was only about 42% black.4
Figure 2 shows that the neighborhoods along the Kansas border, home to
the original country club and shopping district, range from 2% to 17%
black.
Table 1 summarizes the racial and economic characteristics of major
public school districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Contiguous
districts are noted with aY It is also noteworthy, that while white students
and families were not migrating into KCMSD, for over three decades,
minority families had been migrating into the neighboring districts Cen-
ter, Hickman Mills and Raytown. The geographic barrier that separates
North Kansas City has been much less penetrable. However, the
state/county line that separates Johnson County, Kansas (Shawnee Mis-
sion, Blue Valley, Olathe has proven to be even less penetrable.
4. 2000 US Census.
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TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRICTS ADJACENT TO KCMSD (1990 TO 2000)
Average Median Median %
Contig. Daily Household Housing Subsidized
District State County KCMSD Membership Income Unit % Black % Hispanic Lunch
Center MO JK Y 2,676 $33,455 $81,794 39.3% 2.2% 24.5%
Hickman Mills MO JK Y 7,304 $36,570 $64,629 51.1% 1.8% 23.1%
Independence MO JK Y 11299 $34,257 $71,153 3.1% 2.5% 19.3%
North Kansas MO CL Y 16,506 $40,589 $83,144 3.2% 2.5% 13.3%
City
Raytown MO JK Y 8,349 $37,264 $72,651 18.2% 1.9% 13.8%
Kansas City MO JK Y 36,645 $25,363 $50,174 69.4% 5.5% 52.3%
Missouri
Lee's Summit MO JK 12,769 $59,671 $129,400 3.3% 1.4% 6.1%
Blue Springs MO JK 12,409 $56,409 $115,700 3.8% 2.1% 4.9%
Grandview MO JK 4,341 $38,972 $81,209 32.2% 2.1% 22.9%
Liberty School MO CL 5,295 $47,727 $103,560 3.7% 1.4% 9.1%
District
Kansas City KS WY Y 21,743 $26,850 $43,750 52.2% 10.9% 55.0%
Kansas
Shawnee KS JO Y 31,334 $48,176 $114,699 3.4% 2.8% 7.8%
Mission
Blue Valley KS JO 12,648 $78,615 $196,611 1.7% 1.0% 1.3%
Olathe KS JO 17,072 $53,105 $117,201 4.4% 2.1% 6.1%
Piper KS WY 1,239 $57,316 $I4,698 4.2% 3.3% 4.9%
Turner KS WY 3,958 $35,362 $55,052 9.2% 7.4% 30.5%
Data Source. National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data, Fisca-Nonfiscal Longitudinal File
B. Population Trends
Many black families moved from rural communities to Kansas City
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to take
advantage of the city's educational opportunities.' In 1869, the Kansas
City school board opened Lincoln School for black elementary students.6
Between 1880 and 1889, the district opened five more black elementary
schools and in 1887, Lincoln was converted into a secondary school. 7 In
1885, two-thirds of the city's black children were enrolled in its schools, as
compared to less than one-half of the city's white children." Two decades
later, the percentage of black children who attended city schools had
shrunk to a little more than half, but still exceeded white student percent-
5. SHERRY L. SCHIRMER, A CITY DIVIDED: T[E RACIAL LANDSCAPE OF KANSAS CITY,
1900-1960 31 (Univ. of Mo. Press 2002).
6. Id. at 32.
7. Id.
8. Id. at31.
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ages significantly.9 By 1940, there were 12 schools built to educate black
students in KCMSD.10
The black population moving into the city was low-income and
poorly educated, while the white population that was moving to the sub-
urbs was wealthier and better-educated." In 1959, the median income for
the central city was $5,906 compared to $6,828 compared for suburban
residents.1 2 According to the 1960 U.S. Census, 4.1% of central city non-
white families had incomes over $10,000, while 36.5% had incomes be-
low $3,000.13 In contrast, 20.2% of the families living in the suburbs had
incomes over $10,000, while 10.0% had incomes below $3,000.14 Accord-
ing to the 1960 U.S. Census, 53.4% of the Kansas City suburbanites were
high school graduates, in contrast to only 16.7% of central city non-
whites.5
C. School Finance Formulas and Organizational Structures
Prior to Jenkins, Missouri's public school finance system relied heav-
ily on local property taxes.16 In 1955, voters partially addressed the need
for increased educational funding by approving a foundation program and
a cigarette tax.1 7 These initiatives divided school funds into three catego-
ries: equalization, flat grant, and teacher allotments. To qualify for the
first two categories, school districts had to levy a one dollar school tax
and meet attendance requirements for 180 days.19 The equalization pro-
gram guaranteed that poor school districts received $130 per pupil."0 It
did so by providing additional aid to districts that could not raise this
amount on their own. The flat grant added an additional $102 per pupil
who met daily attendance standards.2 1 The school finance formula also
included a teacher daily allotment based on each teacher's level of college
9. Id. at 32.
10. PeterW Moran, What's In a Name: Issues of Race, Gender, Culture, and Power in the
Naming of Public School Buildings in Kansas City, Missouri, 1940-1995, 35 PLAN. & CHANG-
ING 129, 130 (2004).
11. Clifford Hooker &Van D. Mueller, Equal Treatment to Equals: A New Structure for
Public Schools in the Kansas City and St. Louis Metropolitan Areas 21 (1969).
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 24.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Edwin J. Benton, A History of Public Education in Missouri (1965) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University) (on file with authors).
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preparation.2 Teacher allotments encouraged school districts to hire
higher qualified teachers, and rewarded districts that already employed
highly qualified teachers.
23
Before Jenkins, KCMSD already received more funding from the
state's school finance system than most school districts. Our analyses of
available data indicated that in 1968, KCMSD was generating about $554
in local tax revenue per pupil and spending about $802 per pupil. In 1968,
among the relatively small sample of 32 districts reporting, KCMSD's ex-
penditures per pupil in average daily attendance were the second highest
in the state. KCMSD trailed only one small, rural district, and was ahead
of the two Kansas City metro area suburban districts reporting: Liberty
and Clay County.
24
Ironically, KCMSD's high standing may have been a partial result of
the city's strategically planned racial segregation. During the first half of
the 20th century, several high value residential and commercial properties
such as a posh shopping center and an elite country club, had been devel-
oped within the school district. These areas of the city may have been
predominantly white, but their presence increased the property wealth
base of the entire school district.
Unfortunately for KCMSD, these select areas were adjacent to Kan-
sas, where state, local and county officials permitted the district to develop
into a racially restricted community between the 1940s and 1960s. Fur-
ther, because there was ample land available in Kansas, the next wave of
stately mansions were built on the Kansas side of the state line. As a result,
the racially restricted country club was moved to Kansas as well.
It is also important to note that even though KCMSD had more
money available to it than the surrounding suburbs, there was evidence
that the state's funding system may have been insufficient to meet the
needs of KCMSD's growing poor, black population. White flight, a de-
clining tax base, and the rising costs of public services, had all forced
Kansas City to become dependent on federal funding for school finance.25
Before 1966, federal funds never constituted more than 2% of KCMSD's
operating budget. 6 Two years later, it was responsible for 10% of
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY GENERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM (ELSEGIS): PUBLIC ELEMEN-
TARY-SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEMS FINANCES 1967-68 ICPSR 2235 (machine readable
database)(date accessed Oct. 1, 2005).
25. Peter W Moran, Too Little, Too Late: The illusive Goal of School Desegregation in
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KSMSD's operating fund which amounted to $4.2 million in aid from
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) grants. 7
D. Pre-Jenkins Attempts to Desegregate
After the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education28 that de
jure segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, the KCMSD
school board ordered the superintendent and the district's research de-
partment to design a desegregation plan for KCMSD. 9 The transitional
plan called for black and white students attending the school closest to
them regardless of race. The plan also contained a transfer policy that en-
abled students to transfer between schools.3"
The transitional plan failed to desegregate KCMSD.31 One reason
for this was that KCMSD granted student transfers too liberally.3 2 Trans-
fers became a way for students to avoid desegregation.33 Also, attendance
zones did not address problems caused by residential segregation.34 By the
mid-1960s it was clear that desegregation attempts were not working but
KCMSD refused to change. It rejected desegregation alternatives such as
clustering schools, implementing busing, creating magnet schools, and
building schools on sites designed to maximize integration.3 Conse-
quently, by the mid-1970s, Kansas City was no longer in compliance with
constitutional desegregation standards . 6
The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and
the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) used the "carrot and stick" approach
to convince KCMSD to modify its transfer policy.37 In exchange for fed-
eral resources, KCMSD agreed to allow school clustering and busing, and
to develop a magnet school program to attract white students.38
Unfortunately, HEW and OCRs' assistance came too late. In 1960,
there were more than 51,000 white students in KCMSD, constituting
72% of the district's enrollment. 9 However by the mid-1970s, there were
fewer than 20,000 white students in KCMSD, or one-third of the school
27. Id. at 1941.
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
29. Moran, supra note 25, at 1935.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1937.
32. Id. at 1935.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1936.
35. Id. at 1936-40.
36. Id. at 1940.
37. Id. at 1940-48.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1950.
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district's population.0 KCMSD's only chance was to develop a desegrega-
tion plan that that included the surrounding suburbs.4'
E. Calls for Consolidation
Beginning in the mid-1960s, policymakers discussed the possibility
of incorporating parts of the surrounding suburbs into KCMSD 2
KCMSD Superintendent James Hazlett suggested that a metropolitan
approach to education and integration should be seriously considered 3
despite the disapproval of suburban school administrators. In 1968, a
commission appointed by the state legislature recommended that all Kan-
sas City school districts be consolidated in order to address varying
taxable wealth and educational needs among existing districts." Students
in metropolitan areas were adversely and disproportionately affected be-
cause of the high concentrations of disadvantaged people living in the
city45
In 1969, the commission issued a report that set out a strategy for
consolidating KCMSD and St. Louis with the surrounding suburbs.4 6 Its
plan called for a "regional board of education with limited responsibilities
and local boards of education to perform most of the traditional functions
of a school board."47 The regional board would have the responsibility of
levying a uniform education tax throughout the region and distributing
the money to the local boards s.4 The commission also proposed an organ-
izational scheme that clustered urban and suburban school districts. 49
Unfortunately, the state legislature refused to adopt the commission's con-
solidation suggestions because of rural communities that did not want




42. PErER W MORAN, RACE, LAW, AND THE DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 160
(LFB Scholarly Publishing 2005).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 160-61.
45. Id. at 161.
46. HOOKER & MUELLER, supra note 11.
47. Id. at 49.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 51.
50. Id.
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II. MISSOURI V.JENKINS
In the previous section, we outlined the conditions in KCMSD that
led to the Jenkins and Committee for Educational Equality cases and exam-
ined whether these cases addressed the school district's needs. Our review
of the educational history of KCMSD up until the commencement of the
Jenkins litigation shows that district organizational policies and the state's
school finance system are responsible for KCMSD lack of adequate re-
sources. School desegregation efforts neither increased resources for
KCMSD nor altered school district boundaries. These actions, coupled
with the refusal of state officials to consolidate KCMSD with surrounding
suburban districts obstructed the district's desegregation attempts. In this
section we analyze whether.Jenkins helped integrate KCMSD by address-
ing the district's organizational and funding problems.
A. 1977-1984
In March 1977, KCMSD, the superintendent, members of the
school board, and the children of school board members sued the states of
Kansas and Missouri, 18 school districts on both sides of the state line, and
the federal departments of HEW, Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), and the Department of Transportation (DOT)."1 The plaintiffi
alleged that Kansas and Missouri schools were still de jure segregated and
responsible for keeping KCMSD homogenized.52 However, in October
1978, Western District Court of Missouri Judge Russell Clark dismissed
all of the Kansas defendants and realigned KCMSD as a single defen-
dant. 3
In 1979, a new plaintiff group consisting of eight students from the
Kansas City area filed an amended complaint alleging that the Kansas
City public schools were unconstitutionally segregated. 4 The state of Mis-
souri, 13 suburban school districts surrounding KCMSD, KCMSD, and
the federal departments of HEW, HUD, and DOT were all named as de-
fendants. KCMSD subsequently filed a cross-claim against the state
claiming that the state had failed to dismantle its previous dual system."
In 1984, Judge Clark dismissed the suburban school districts and
federal agencies from the lawsuit, but ruled that KCMSD and the state
had operated a dejure segregated school district. 6 Clark also declared that
"much of the cost for preparing and implementing a plan to dismantle
51. Id. at 163.
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id. at 169-70.
54. Id. at 175-76.
55. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F Supp. 1485 (D. Mo. 1984).
56. Id.
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the vestiges of a dual system in KCMSD should be borne by the state"
because the state had the "primary responsibility for insuring that the
public education systems in the State comport with the United States
Constitution. ' 7
The plaintiffs' originally hoped to bring about a restructuring of the
Kansas City-metropolitan area through the opening left in Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken 1) .58 Milliken authorizes interdistrict remedies if plaintiffs
can prove that the suburban districts operated under a racially discrimina-
tory intent.5 1 When Clark ruled that the state was de jure segregated, the
plaintiffs assumed that the verdict implied a finding of metropolitan-wide
discrimination.6" Accordingly, they drafted a plan to consolidate KCMSD
with the surrounding 11 suburban school districts. However, Judge Clark
struck down the plan because the court lacked the authority under Mil-
liken I to order the restructuring of school districts where no
constitutional violation had occurred." As the judge explained, "because
of restrictions on this Court's remedial powers in restructuring the opera-
tions of local and state government entities, that portion of KCMSD plan
which would require the consolidation of eleven suburban school districts
with KCMSD goes far beyond the nature and extent of the constitutional
violation this Court found existed."62
B. District Court Remedial Orders (1985-88)
In June 1985,Judge Clark issued his first remedial order.63 He found
that "[s]egregation has caused a system wide reduction in student achieve-
ment in the schools of the KCMSD" 64 Judge Clark then ordered a variety
of remedial programs, pursuant to the Supreme Court's 1977 Milliken v.
Bradley decision (Milliken II), which authorized federal district courts to
impose remedial programs designed to eliminate the effects of prior dis-
crimination.6 He then ordered a wide range of educational programming
designed to increase student achievement. Among other things, Clark held
that KCMSD must be restored to AAA status, which was the highest level
of accreditation granted by the state department of education.6 6 Clark also
57. Id. at 1506.
58. Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
59. An Ordinary Case with an Extraordinary Remedy (Miller Center for Public Affairs,
University ofVirginia, 2000) (on file with the authors).
60. Id.
61. See Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 807 E2d 657, 698 (8th Cir. 1986) (summa-
rizing district court'sJanuary 1985 order).
62. Id.
63. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 E Supp. 19 (WD. Mo. 1985).
64. Id. at 24 (emphasis supplied by the court).
65. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,285 (U.S. 1977).
66. Jenkins, 639 E Supp. at 26.
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ordered that class sizes must be reduced to "remedy the vestiges of past
discrimination by increasing individual attention and instruction, as well
as increasing the potential for desegregative educational experiences for
KCMSD students by maintaining and attracting non-minority enroll-
ment."67 Clark further ordered the adoption of summer school, full-day
kindergarten, before and after school tutoring, and early childhood devel-
opment programs. 6' He then directed the state to fund an effective schools
program for all KCMSD schools6 9 and to adopt an extensive capital im-
provements program.7"
Although Clark acknowledged that his 1984 opinion held that the
state was primarily responsible for bearing the costs of implementing the
desegregation plan, he did shift some of the financial burden to
KCMSD.71 KCMSD's operating levy at the time of the June 1985 order
was $3.75 per $100 assessed valuation. However, a rollback statute called
for the district's operating levy to be reduced to $3.26, and a statewide
reassessment would reduce the levy below $3.26. Consequently, KCMSD
was $3 million short of the revenue needed to pay for the levy and the
district's only unallocated funds were an $850,000 to $1 million contin-
gency fund.72 Clark ordered that the rollback be enjoined for one year to
enable the state to raise an additional $4 million and to give KCMSD the
opportunity to submit a tax levy increase at the next regularly scheduled
school election. 3 In subsequent decisions, Clark increased the district's
levy to $4.96.7"
In 1987, Clark concluded that KCMSD did not have sufficient re-
sources to fund its share of the remedy.7 Therefore, he imposed a 1.5%
increase on the state income tax on KCMSD residents, business associa-
tions, partnerships, and corporations.76 The surcharge was to remain in
effect until the bonds were retired or until other provisions were imple-
mented that would ensure their fulfillment. Clark also ordered KCMSD
to increase its property tax levy from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 assessed
67. Id. at 29.
68. See id. at 30-33.
69. See id. at 33-34.
70. See id. at 39-41.
71. Id. at 43.
72. Id. at 44.
73. Id. at 45.
74. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1992 WL 551568, at 9 (WD. Mo.
Jun. 25, 1992) (authorizing KCMSD to maintain its property tax levy at a rate of $4.96
per $100 assessed valuation for the 1992-93 school year); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-
0420-CV-W-4, at 6 1993 WL 546576 (WD. Mo.Jun. 30, 1993) (authorizing KCMSD to
maintain its property tax levy at a rate of $4.96 per $100 assessed valuation for the 1993-
94, 1994-95, and 1995-96 school years).
75. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F Supp. 400, 411 (WD. Mo. 1987).
76. Id. at 412.
77. Id. at 413.
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valuation through the 1991-92 school year.78 He then directed KCMSD
to issue capital improvement bonds totaling $150 million, which would
be retired within 20 years of the date issued."
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the scope of the capital im-
provements and the validity of the proposed property tax increase. The
court reasoned that the property tax increase, did not overstep the court's
remedial power.8 ° It also noted that state law could not hamper a court
from remedying a constitutional violation." However, the Eighth Circuit
cautioned Judge Clark to pay more deference "to the views of state and
local officials and to the working of local tax collection procedures to the
extent that they appear compatible with the goals to be achieved.!'8 2 The
appropriate method for determining KCMSD's funding obligation was
for the district court to "authorize the school board to submit a proposed
levy to the collection authorities adequate to fund its budget, including its
share of the cost of the desegregation programs ordered by the district
court" and to enlist county and state officials that would reduce the levy
below the amount set by the board."
The income surcharge however, was declared unconstitutional. The
Eighth Circuit declared the income tax surcharge unconstitutional be-
cause the district court exceeded its remedial authority.84 While Judge
Clark was authorized to set aside restrictions imposed by state law that
hindered it from dismantling a dual educational system, he was not em-
powered to restructure the tax system.8" Thus, the income tax surcharge
exceeded the district court's authority because the tax "restructure[d] the
State's scheme of school financing and create[d] an entirely new form of
taxing authority."8 6
C. Supreme Court Decision (1990)
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the state's certiorari petition.,7 The
Court held that the property tax increase imposed by the district court
exceeded its authority in imposing the tax increase itself, and that the
Eighth Circuit should have reversed the district court in this regard.8 The
Court noted that "[i]n assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1311.
81. Id. at 1313.
82. Id. at 1314.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1315.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
88. Id. at 52.
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power of taxation the [d]istrict [c]ourt not only intruded on local author-
ity but circumvented it altogether." 9 Before taking on this task, Judge
Clark should have determined whether less intrusive options were avail-
able.90 The Supreme Court rejected the district court's conclusion that it
had no choice but to impose the tax increase because the Eighth Circuit
had presented a viable option. That is, Clark could have authorized
KCMSD to impose property taxes at a rate sufficient to fund the remedy
and could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have pre-
vented the school district from exercising such power.91
The Supreme Court dismissed the state's claim that Article III and
the Tenth Amendment barred the federal judiciary from directing a local
governmental entity to levy taxes necessary to comply with the desegre-
gation decree. The Court found that the Tenth Amendment was not
implicated when a federal court was remedying a state violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This was the case because the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to curtail state conduct that violated the Con-
stitution.92 With respect to Article III, the Court observed that a court
order ordering a local governmental body to levy its own taxes was
within the scope of a federal court's power.93
D. Supreme Court Decision (1995)
The Supreme Court again ruled on the Kansas City desegregation
litigation in 1995. This challenge dealt with two components of the dis-
trict court's remedial order. The first component required the state to
finance salary increases for KCMSD instructional and non-instructional
staff. The state asserted that funding for salaries went beyond the district
court's remedial authority.94 The second component required the state to
continue financing quality educational programs for the 1992-93 school
year. The state asserted that such funding was prohibited by Freeman v.
Pitts9 because the state had achieved partial unitary status with respect to
the state's quality programming.96
Judge Clark rejected the state's arguments. He held that the salary
increases were necessary to improve educational opportunities and to re-
duce racial isolation. 7 He also held that in order to eliminate the vestiges
89. Id. at 51.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 55.
93. Id.
94. Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,80, (1995).
95. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
96. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.
97. Id.
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of past discrimination, it was necessary to improve the "desegregative at-
tractiveness" of KCMSD.9 8 Although Clark did not address the state's
claim that it no longer had to provide funding for quality education be-
cause it had achieved unitary status with respect to this issue, he
nonetheless ordered the state to continue providing funding for quality
programs.9
The Eighth Circuit upheld the holding of the district court.' It re-
jected the state's claim that the salary increases were not directly related to
a state constitutional violation. In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that the remedy was not only designed to compensate victims of
KCMSD's discriminatory practices, but was also designed to reverse white
flight by providing superior educational opportunities.' The court also
rejected the state's assertion that it had achieved unitary status with re-
spect to quality programming because KCMSD was still below national
norms at a number of grade levels.102
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's holding that the
state must fund salary increases and quality education programs exceeded
the court's remedial authority and remanded the case back to the district
court."3 The Court found that the district court's decree violated the Mil-
liken I decisions because it "created a magnet district of the KCMSD in
order to serve the interdistrict goal of attracting nonminority students
from the [surrounding school districts] and redistributing them within the
KCMSD."'10 4
The Court also ruled Judge Clark's order requiring the state to con-
tinue funding quality educational programming because student
achievement levels were below national norms to be inadequate.' 9 It
noted that the basic chore of the district court was to determine whether
the reduction in achievement in minority students caused by KCMSD's
prior de jure discrimination was reduced to a practical level." 6 However,
Judge Clark had failed to determine the effect that segregation had on the
performance of minority students.' 7 Moreover, the Court believed that
many of the goals of its quality education programs had been achieved.
The Court explained that KCMSD had achieved AAA accreditation
status and that students who had attended schools that had not received
98. Id.
99. Id. at 80-81.
100. Jenkins ex rel.Agyei v. Missouri, 11 E3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993).
101. Id. at 767.
102. Id. at 761-62.
103. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 70.
104. Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
105. Id. at 100.
106. Id. at 101.
107. Id.
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such status had received remedial programming for up to seven years.1°8
Finally, the Court reminded Judge Clark to "bear in mind that its end
purpose is not only 'to remedy the violation' to the extent practicable, but
also 'to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system
that is operating in compliance with the Constitution.'"""
E. Settlement Decree (1997-98)
Energized by its victory before the Supreme Court, the state moved
in April 1996 for a declaration of unitary status."' In May 1996, the state
and KCMSD entered into an agreement whereby the state would be
dismissed from the case once it had paid $320 million in desegregation
funds to KCMSD over a three-year period, with the court's approval."'
The termination agreement would have kept in place the court-ordered
KCMSD tax levy, which had been raised to $4.96 per $100 in assessed
value."2 In March 1997,Judge Clark approved the agreement, but refused
to grant KCMSD's request to extend court supervision until alternative
funding sources were guaranteed."3 He held that the district court did not
have the power to impose the levy in order to avoid "fiscal chaos.""
4
Judge Clark also rejected the argument that there was still residual "finan-
cial vestige" from prior discrimination."5 Essentially, KCMSD argued that
the actions of the state created an atmosphere that made it impossible for
the district to raise sufficient funds to run its schools."6 Clark rejected this
argument because it was the duty of KCMSD and the state to ensure that
the district had adequate funding."7
During the transitional period, Clark ordered KCMSD to reduce
the achievement gap between black and white students by 2.6 normalized
curve equivalents (NCE's) because "13% of the initial gap and 13% of the
increase in the gap may be traced to the prior discrimination within
KCMSD." 1" 8 He also ordered the district to modify its budget process "so
that actual expenditures may be reconciled with the budgeted amounts
for each line item by department." '9 Clark found that the state had not
achieved unitary status with regard to racial balance, but held that the
108. Id. at 102.
109. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. at 489).
110. Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 E Supp. 1151, 1154 (WD. Mo. 1997).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1162.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1169.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1165.
119. Id. at 1179.
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state had achieved unitary status with respect to extracurricular activi-
ties.' 2
0
Judge Clark's 1997 opinion is noteworthy because of his reflections
regarding the successes and failures of the desegregation decree. He ob-
served that "the Court remains proud of the innovations it ordered," and
that "[a] large amount of the money spent in the District has indeed re-
sulted in tangible benefits.' 121 These benefits included "new and renovated
schools, an increased number of computers, higher technology available to
all students, and intervention programs to help impoverished children.1122
Despite the strides made by the district during the Jenkins litigation, Clark
acknowledged that the performance of KCMSD was still inadequate in
many areas.'23 Among other things, he noted the lack of a comprehensive
instructional program, ongoing administrative instability, lack of a security
plan, and the lack of a budgeting plan."4 He was also troubled by the fact
that only five elementary schools, one middle school, and one high school
achieved or surpassed the statewide average on the Missouri Mastery and
Achievement Tests (MMAT) .12
Judge Clark concluded that these deficiencies were not caused by a
lack in educational resources because "KCMSD ha[d] an operating
budget that far exceed[ed] the budgets of other school districts. ' 126 Clark
was also troubled by the witness testimony about the "size and inefficien-
cies of KCMSD administration. ' 127 Because he was concerned that
KCMSD was not up to the task of getting its financial affairs in order
during the transitional period,1 28 he appealed to the state educational
commissioner and the state department of education to cover KCMSD
during the transitional phase. 29 If they declined his request, then Clark
would seek the department's help in finding a Special Master to manage
KCMSD. 
3 0
KCMSD appealed Judge Clark's holding that it was not the district
court's duty to guarantee funding for the district and that there was no
financial vestige of prior discrimination. 131 After the appeal was argued,
120. See id. at 1165-68. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Clark's ruling on appeal.
Jenkins ex rel. v. Missouri, 122 F3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
121. Jenkins, 959 E Supp. at 1173.
122. Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1173-74.
125. Id. at 1173.
126. Id. at 1174. We analyze whether KCMSD was such a high-spending district in
SectionV
127. Id. at 1177.
128. Id. at 1178.
129. Id. at 1178-79.
130. Id. at 1179.
131. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 158 F3d 984 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Missouri voters adopted a constitutional amendment that authorized
school boards whose operating levy for 1995 was set by court order to set
subsequent tax rates at any levy below the 1995 rate, which was $4.96 for
KCMSD. 13 Additionally, the state legislature enacted Senate Bill 781,
which set the operating levy for KCMSD at $4.95. This legislation was
contingent upon the St. Louis case being settled by March 15, 1999.133
The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal because it was no longer ripe for
review now that is was possible for KCMSD to fund school construction
projects.34
F March to Unitary Status (1999-2003)
After the March 1997 order, Judge Clark excused himself from the
Jenkins litigation.13s The case was then reassigned to Judge Dean
Whipple. 136 True to Clark's predictions, many of the chronic problems
facing the district endured.137 In October 1999, the state department of
education unanimously voted to designate the KCSMD as unaccred-
ited.'-3 State officials found that the district satisfied none of the 11 state
performance standards for accreditation, including general academic
achievement, reading achievement, college entrance exam scores, atten-
dance, and dropout rates. 139 Judge Whipple found that the state
department of education's curriculum standards were consistent with the
district court's desegregation decree because they both encouraged the
district to take steps to improve academic achievement.' 4 Whipple also
found that the board's decision to designate KCMSD as unaccredited
could help the district achieve the goals of the desegregation order by
holding it accountable for its educational failures.14 1 Moreover, Whipple
rejected KCMSD's assertion that the board's removal of accreditation
status would make it virtually impossible for the district to comply with
its desegregation order. "While the negative consequences of an unac-
credited designation, both direct and indirect, may indeed be real"
Whipple observed that teachers and students may more likely leave
132. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 11 (g).
133. S.B. 781,89th Gen.Assemb. (Mo. 1998).
134. Jenkins, 158 E3d at 986.
135. MoRAN, supra note 42, at 272.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Jenkins v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, Mo., 73 F.Supp. 2d 1058, 1059 (WD. Mo.
1999).
139. Id. at 1067-68.
140. See id. at 1076.
141. See id. at 1077.
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KCMSD because of the "realization that KCMSD is not, in fact, provid-
ing the education needed." '142
Judge Whipple held sua sponte that KCMSD had achieved unitary
status and dismissed pending litigation."' Whipple acted in this manner
because the district had made considerable progress toward eliminating
vestiges of prior segregation to the extent practical and because the state's
accreditation standards would force KCMSD to take the necessary steps
to improve educational outcomes."' Additionally, Whipple dismissed the
suit because KCMSD was providing an equal education to its students,
regardless of race.1 5 Still, Whipple cautioned that the U.S. Constitution
does not set educational standards; thus, "it is incumbent on this Court to
ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment not become so corrupted as to
guarantee educational standards that it was not meant to ensure "146 The
Eighth Circuit reversed Whipple's sua sponte ruling stating that KCMSD
had attained unitary status. It also released the district from further court
supervision because the parties were entitled to notice and a hearing be-
fore the district court dismissed the case.1 47
On March 2001,Judge Whipple presided over a unitary status hear-
ing on KCMSD's motion for partial unitary status. 148 Twelve months later,
Whipple held that the district had achieved unitary status with regard to
racial balance, facilities, budget and transportation.14 1 On March 2003,
Judge Whipple granted KCMSD's motion for unitary status because the
district had reduced the achievement gap by the amount required by
Judge Clark in his 1997 decision and because the district had complied
with the district court's orders in good faith for a reasonable amount of
time. 150
III. COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY v. STATE
The Committee for Educational Equality v. State case began in 1990,
when plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that the state's school finance sys-
tem violated the state constitution." ' The Committee for Educational
Equality was a non-profit group representing poor rural and urban school
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1079.
144. Id. at 1080.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Jenkins ex. rel.Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 E3d 720,727 (8th Cir. 2000).
148. Jenkins v. School Dist. of Kan. City, Mo., No. 77-0420-CV-W-DW, slip op. at 4
(WD. Mo.Aug. 13, 2003).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 29-30.
151. Molly A Hunter, Litigation: Missouri, NATIONAL AcCEss NETWORK, at http://
www.schoolfunding.info/states/rno/lit-mo.php3 (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
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districts. The St. Louis and Kansas City School districts joined the case as
intervenor-plaintiffs and four affluent districts joined as intervenor-
defendants.1 12 This section provides a summary of the trial court opinion,
discusses the state legislature's response (i.e. the Outstanding Schools Act),
and provides a brief summary of key points from the Jenkins and Commit-
tee for Educational Equality decisions.
A. Trial Court Opinion
In January 1993, a state trial court held that the Missouri school fi-
nance system violated the state equal protection clause because "the
wealth of the local community is the primary and predominant determi-
nant of the quality of a child's education in Missouri."'" 3 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that "[a] high and very significant correlation
exists among all school districts between state and local revenues per pupil
and equalized assessed valuation[s] of property per pupil."' 1 4 The court
found that an even higher correlation existed "between the statutorily
determined measure of local fiscal capacity" and "state and local revenues
per pupil."'" 5 Funding inequalities between rich and poor school districts
could not be justified "by asserting that the poor have brought the plight
upon themselves by putting forth [a] low local fiscal effort to support the
public schools" because the data clearly indicated that disparities were
caused by local wealth, not local choice. 1
5 6
Moreover, the court held that the school finance system violated the
education clause because it failed to provide adequate funding to meet
the educational needs of their students."7 The state's failure to fund educa-
tion existed in spite of the fact that the state had the capacity to fund
education. Missouri ranked 49th among states in terms of current expen-
ditures for public schools as a percent of personal income. ' In fact, in
order to raise current per-pupil expenditures to the national average in
1989-90 of $4,975 it would have to raise an additional $957 million.119
The court neither ordered the redistribution of educational funding
nor instructed the state legislature as to how it could satisfy its constitu-
tional duty. The court simply stayed the judgment for 90 days after the
152. Id.
153. Committee for Educ. Equal. v. State, No. CV190-1371CC, slip op. at 12 (Cir.
Ct. Cole County Jan. 15, 1993).
154. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 20.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id.
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next regular session so that the legislature had a chance to enact a school
finance system that complied with the state constitution.1 60
B. Outstanding Schools Act
In response to the trial court decision, in 1993, the legislature en-
acted the Outstanding Schools Act, which, increased matching aid levels,
encouraged all districts to raise their property tax levies, and modestly
altered other features of the school finance formula.16 ' The act included
"provisions relating to reduced class size, the A+ schools program, funding
for parents as teachers and early childhood development, teacher training,
the upgrading of vocational and technical education, measures to promote
accountability 4nd other provisions of those sections.1 62 Like its predeces-
sor, the formula provided school districts with a guaranteed tax base, but
raised the minimum local property tax rate without a voter referendum
from $1.25 to $2.75 for every $100 of assessed value. 63 Matching aid ra-
tios were determined by the ratio of each district's taxable assessed
property value per pupil compared to the state guaranteed assessed valua-
tion per pupil. 64 It also included an income multiplier (district income
factor) to drive more matching aid to lower income districts.6 5 If a dis-
trict's own assessed value per pupil is approximately 50% of the state
guarantee, that district would receive $1 for each dollar raised from local
property income in state aid. School districts also received additional
funding for sanctioned uses such as for special education students and stu-
dents eligible for free or reduced lunch. 6
This would mean that in a year, a state with a guaranteed wealth of
$150,000, the minimum attainable state and local revenue per pupil with-
out voter referendum would be $4,125. For a district with 50% of the
guaranteed wealth, the district would be entitled to $2,062 in state aid.
Similarly, a district with 20% children who qualified for free or reduced
lunch, the district would be entitled to at a minimum, $4,290 per child in
state aid. If that same district had a lower than average income, state aid
per pupil would be adjusted slightly upward. In short, the higher the
160. Id. at 33. The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the defendants' appeal because
the trial court opinion was not a final, appealable judgment. Committee for Educ. Equal. v.
State, 878 S.W2d 446,454 (Mo. 1994).
161. See Mo. REV. STAT. 5 160.500-160.538, 160.545, 160.550, 161.099, 161.610,
162.203, 162.1010, 163.023, 166.275, 166.300, 170.254, 173.750, 178.585, 178.698 (West
2005).
162. Id. § 160.500(1).
163. Id. § 163.031(1).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 163.031(1).
166. Id. § 163.031(3).
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number of children in poverty and lower income levels, the higher the
matching rate of state aid.
167
In 1993, KCMSD was still abiding by the $4.96 levy imposed by
Judge Clark, which was substantially greater than the $2.75 minimum
imposed by the Outstanding Schools Act.6 ' The KCMSD continued to
operate under the court-imposed levy after the passage of the act, mean-
ing that the act did little to change the financial circumstances of
KCMSD 69 As mentioned earlier, the state legislature adopted Senate Bill
781, which set tax rate for KCMSD at $4.95. Meaning, that the state met
its state constitutional obligation by allowing the local boards of education
to access a $2.75 tax rate to generate "adequate" funding, while requiring
KCMSD to levy a $4.95 tax rate.
In 2005 the Missouri legislature adopted more changes to the
school finance formula. The adjustments guarantee $6,117 per pupil in
foundation level funding on a 7-year phase-in plan. It also includes higher
weighted rates for low-income and limited English proficient students.
The plan is partially supported by raising the local tax from $2.75 to
$3.43.Yet despite these modifications, the court still expects KCMSD to
shoulder a $4.95 tax rate which is higher than every other school dis-
trict.1 7  Accordingly, the Committee for Educational Equality has
challenged the new school finance formula on the ground that it exacer-
bates the constitutional deficiencies of the school finance system.1 71
The legislature's decision to continue to codify KCMSD's court-
imposed tax levy for its school finance formula directly contradicts the
approach that many states take with regard to high-need school districts.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, many states had already moved away
from tax rate driven, matching aid formulas. The new aid distribution
formulas set a base level of funding and implement a variety of need
weighting mechanisms. This ensures that qualified students receive in each
district, receive a need adjusted basic level of funding. Each district then
levies a state required tax rate. For districts whose property taxes are not
167. Nonetheless, R. Craig Wood & Associates, in a 2003 Report to Missouri Legis-
lators, found that funding levels remained highly associated with district property wealth
and income and almost entirely associated with local property tax rates. R. CRAIG WOOD
ET AL., FINANCING MISSOURI'S PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: FINAL RE-
PORT (2003).
168. Jenkins v. Missouri, 1992 WL 551568 at 9, (WD. Mo.Jun. 25, 1992) (authoriz-
ing KCMSD to maintain its property tax levy at a rate of $4.96 per $100 assessed
valuation for the 1992-93 school year).
169. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1993 WL 546576, at 6 (WD. Mo.
Jun. 30, 1993) (authorizing KCMSD to maintain its property tax levy at a rate of $4.96
per $100 assessed valuation for the 1993-94, 1994-95, and 1995-96 school years).
170. See Mo. R.EV. STAT. § 163.011.
171. Missouri School Boards' Association, School Districts File Updated Lawsuit Chal-
lenging State Funding (11/28/2005), NEWS AND EvENTs, at http://www.msbanet.org/
news/news.asp?ID =281.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
enough to ensure a "basic level of funding,' the state makes up the differ-
ence with state funds.7 2 Under this model, if KCMSD's need level been
estimated at 40 to 50% above the basic level, it would have been the state's
responsibility to fill the gap. SB 287 employs a foundation plan, but its
effectiveness is diminished because the actual student need adjustments in
the formula are too low to adequately help poor districts such as
KCMSD and St. Louis. Therefore, funding generated in these districts at
only the $3.43 levy is not enough and will be only partially offset by
KCMSD's higher tax rate.
C. Summary ofJenkins and Committee for Educational Equality
Our analysis of the Jenkins litigation reveals that Judge Clark at-
tempted to enforce remedies on KCMSD and the state of Missouri by
relying on the federal court precedents made by Milliken I and Milliken II.
Clark refused to redraw district boundaries. Instead, he imposed a high
property tax on KCMSD in order to generate sufficient state and local
revenue under the state's existing school finance formula.The state legisla-
ture's response to KCMSD's concerns about funding after it had achieved
unitary status was to continue imposing local property taxes at the level
set by Judge Clark.
In addition, the state legislature's reaction to the Committee for Educa-
tional Equality litigation proceedings was to accept the state court's decree
that educational equity and adequacy across schools in the state were pri-
marily state legislative responsibilities-except in the case of KCMSD. For
KCMSD, the state legislature deemed it appropriate to hold the district to
the much higher Jenkins standard despite the fact that it contradicted the
funding approach a number of states had adopted for their high-need dis-
tricts.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF KCMSD SAGA FOR SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
A number of conservatives have used KCMSD experience as proof
that there is no correlation between funding and educational outcome. In
this section, we provide an overview of school finance litigation and
document how several courts have come to conclude that a correlation
exists.
172. Bruce D. Baker & William D. Duncombe, Balancing District Needs and Student
Needs: The Role of Economies of Scale Adjustments and Pupil Need Weights in School Finance
Formulas, 29 J. or EDUC. FIN. 97 (2004).
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A. Overview of School Finance Litigation
Scholars have divided school finance litigation into three waves.
Each wave represents a different legal strategy that characterized the era. '73
During the first wave, which lasted from the late 1960s to 1973, plaintiffi
claimed that funding disparities between rich and poor school districts
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
However in 1973, this approach was no longer a viable option because
the Supreme Court held in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez that using local property taxes to fund public schools did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-even if it
caused poorer schools to receive substantially less than their more affluent
counterparts.'74
In the second wave of school finance litigation, which lasted from
1973 to 1989, plaintiffs asserted that funding disparities between rich and
poor school districts violated state equal protection and education clauses.
These cases failed mainly because courts held that disparities created by
local property taxation did not violate state constitutional provisions.7
In the current wave, which began in 1989, plaintiffi have asserted
that the existing school finance systems prevent states from providing
poor school districts with an adequate education as defined by their state
education clauses. The seminal case is Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc., a case in which the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the state's
entire education system for not providing students with an adequate edu-
cation as required by the state constitution's education clause.'76
In several successful third wave adequacy cases, courts have defined
an "adequate education" in terms of academic outcomes. Subsequently,
they directed state legislature to develop remedies that will comply with
their mandates.'77 Several courts have also found that a correlation exists
between educational spending and academic performance. In Rose, for
instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that "achievement test
scores in the poorer districts are lower than those of rich districts and ex-
pert testimony clearly established that there is a correlation between those
173. See Kent K. Anker, Differences and Dialogue: School Finance in New York State, 24
N.Y.U. RaV. oF L. & SoC. CHANGE 345 (1998); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New
Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995); Michael Heise, State Con-
stitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave," 68 TEMp. L. R.Ev. 1151 (1995).
174. San. Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,54 (1973).
175. Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker, Circumventing Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use
the Equal Protection Clause to Challenge School Finance Disparities Caused by Inequitable Distri-
bution Policies?, Thx. E ON C.L. & C.R. 141,147 (2002).
176. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
177. See e.g., id.; Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 144 S.W3d 741 (Ark.
2004); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993);
Claremont v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997).
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scores and the wealth of the district. '' 17 The court also noted that the fact
that "Kentucky's overall effort and resulting achievement in the area of
primary and secondary education are comparatively low, nationally, is not
in dispute."1 79
In Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, the state of Arkansas
disputed a claim that it was not providing students with an adequate edu-
cation by arguing that no correlation existed between increased
educational funding and improved school performance.18 The state as-
serted that it had increased educational spending in response to the state
supreme court's holding that the school finance system was unconstitu-
tional in DuPree v. Alma School District No. 30.11' They also contended that
the increase in education spending was unnecessary because student per-
formance had not significantly improved. The state supreme court
rejected this claim, in part, because the state's efforts to "correct the course
of educational deficiencies in Arkansas [were] dependent on quality
teachers."1 12 The state had failed to ensure that its poor school districts
would have quality teachers. In fact, the entry level for teacher salaries in
Arkansas was 48th in the nation and the lowest of the nine states in the
region." 3 There were also serious disparities in teacher salaries causing
poorer school districts to lose teachers because of the low wages." 4
In Campaign for Fiscal Equity Inc. v. State, ' the New York Court of
Appeals found that there is a correlation between the school finance sys-
tem and the poor performance of New York City students. Increased
funding could improve student performance by equipping NewYork City
schools with the money to obtain better teachers, facilities, and other aca-
demic resources. '
B. The KCMSD Desegregation Plan as Proof That "Money Doesn't Matter"
The conservative claim that KCMSD proves that no correlation ex-
ists between increased funding and educational outcomes rests on three
premises. The first premise is that KCMSD received more money for edu-
cation than the rest of the country for an extended period. For instance, a
1998 report from the Cato Institute claims that on a cost of living ad-
justed basis, KCMSD "spent as much as $11,700 per-pupil-more money
178. Rose, 790 S.W2d at 197.
179. Id. (emphasis supplied).
180. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W3d 472, 488 (Ark. 2002).
181. See Dupree v.Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,651 S.W2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
182. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25,91 S.W3d at 489.
183. Id. at 488-89.
184. Id. at 489.
185. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y 2003).
186. Id. at 340-41.
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per pupil than any of the other 280 largest districts in the country" and
that "[KCMSD] got [the extra money] for more than a decade.' 8 7
The second premise is that because the added resources did not lead
to improved student outcomes, KCMSD's desegregation plan underscores
why pouring exorbitant sums of tax dollars into poor, urban, black
schools is non-productive and inefficient. After the trial court in Campaign
for Fiscal Equity ruled that the state's school finance system already pro-
vided New York City school children with an adequate education,
esteemed educational economist Eric Hanushek cited Jenkins as an exam-
ple as to why additional funding would not lead to improved student
performance in city schools. Hanushek asserted:
One need only look at the results in Kansas City. A school de-
segregation ruling in the 1980s began a period of more than a
decade when the schools had access to virtually unlimited state
funds. The dreams of school personnel did not translate into
any measurable gains in student performance, even as their
schools moved to the very top of national spending."8
In another example, David Armor and Christine Rossell observed
that the achievement levels of black fifth-graders on the Iowa Tests of Ba-
sic Skills (ITBS) was significantly below the achievement levels of white
fifth-graders from 1988 to 1995. However, they warned against increasing
spending because of the failures that occurred with KCMSD. Armor and
Rossell suggested that "[w]ith a unique court-ordered tax levy and court-
ordered funding from the state, total expenditures [in KCMSD] reached
$10,000 per pupil by 1990, with total funding exceeding $1.5 billion over
approximately an eight-year period.""89 "Thus, spending an extraordinary
amount of money on a school desegregation plan and on magnet schools
does not seem to improve minority achievement significantly or decrease
the minority-white achievement gap."'90 Critics also point to KCMSD's
loss of accreditation in 2000 as evidence that the desegregation plan was
an abject failure."'
187. Paul Ciotti, Money and School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City Desegrega-
tion Experiment, Policy Analysis No. 298 at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-298.pdf (last
visited Dec. 2, 2005).
188. Eric A. Hanushek, Have New York City Children Been Saved?, HOOVER INSTITU-
TION, at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/pubaffairs/we/2002/hanushek-0302.html (last
modified Mar. 25,2002).
189. David J. Armor & Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the
Public Schools, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE 219, 247, (Abigail Thernstrom & Stephen
Thernstrom eds. 2002).
190. Id. at 248.
191. David W Kirkpatrick, For Schools Money Isn't the Answer, U.S. FREEDOM FOuNDA-
TION, at http://www.freedomfoundation.us/for-schools.money_in_t_the_answer (last
visited Nov. 29,2005).
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The third premise is that the state's financial assistance for high-need
urban school districts hurts other state districts by exhausting state re-
sources. For example, a 1993 article in The Economist asserted that "[m]ore
than three-quarters of the cost" of the desegregation plan "was borne by
the state rather than the school district." '192 According to the 1998 Cato
Institute report, the state attorney general, Jay Nixon, claimed that "44
percent of the entire state budget for elementary and secondary education
was going to just 9 percent of the state's students who lived in Kansas
City and St. Louis."'1 93 To replace the money spent on St. Louis and
KCMSD, "other districts in the state had to cancel field trips and extra-
curricular activities, defer maintenance, fire teachers, and freeze salaries. '" 194
V EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE
As previously mentioned, the conservative claim that the KCMSD
desegregation plan clearly establishes that there is no correlation between
educational outcomes and student achievement rests on three premises:
(1) KCMSD received more money than other school districts over an
extended period; (2) because the exorbitant spending on KCMSD did
not lead to improvement in educational outcomes, the plan is the national
model for why spending large sums on predominantly black schools is
non-productive and inefficient; and (3) the state of Missouri covered a
disproportionate share of the costs of the desegregation plan which indi-
rectly harmed the state's other school districts. In this section, we
empirically analyze each of these claims.
A. Premise # 1: Did KCMSD Receive More Money Than Other
School Districts Over an Extended Period?
In order to determine the validity of this premise we must compare
how much KCMSD spent per pupil and for how long with neighboring
school districts:
1. Relative to public school districts located in large urban
centers nationally, how did the Kansas City Missouri
school district's actual current operating expenditures and
current instructional expenditures compare?;
2. Relative to other public school districts in the Kansas
City Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA),
192. The Cash Street Kids: Kansas City, Missouri Public School Performance Lags, 328 THE
ECONOMIST 24 (1993), at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=371074&sid=3&Fmt=
3&clientld=9874&RQT=309&VName=PQD (last visited Feb. 22,2006).
193. Ciotti, supra note 187, at 10.
194. Id.
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how much more per pupil did the Kansas City Missouri
public schools spend from 1990 to 2000?; and
3. Relative to other public school districts in the Kansas
City CMSA, how did the demographics of Kansas City
Missouri public schools differ and change from 1990 to
2000?
Table 2 summarizes the operating per-pupil and instructional ex-
penditures of KCMSD relative to other major metropolitan districts
nationally throughout the 1990s. The data for the years 1990 to 2000 are
from the National Center for Education Statistics, Fiscal-Non-fiscal lon-
gitudinal file. The data in Table 2 includes only those districts in NCES
Locale code "1 ," for districts in large 'central cities. Only districts enrolling
at least 20,000 students were included. No regional cost or student need-
based adjustments are applied in the initial analysis. The data set includes
51 to 77 districts per year.
Table 2 shows that from 1990 to 2000, KCMSD was a high expen-
diture district. It spent 12% to 76% more than other major metropolitan
districts in current operating expenditures per pupil. However this was
only 2% to 38% above other major metropolitan districts in instructional
expenditures per pupil; a portion of the difference between current oper-
ating and instructional spending being current expenditures to pay off
costs associated with capital projects tied to the desegregative attractive-
ness plan. Also, KCMSD's operational and instructional edge declined
rapidly from 1995 to 2000 following the U.S. Supreme Court decision to
halt district court remedies. It would thus appear from Table 2 that
KCMSD's operating funding peaked for a window of about three to five
years-not the ten year period often argued. Moreover, Table 2 includes
data from 1968 and 1980 from a national survey of school finance (Ele-
mentary and Secondary General Information Survey). These figures show
that in 1980 and as far back as 1968, KCMSD was already spending sig-
nificantly more than large urban districts elsewhere in the nation. In fact,
in 1968 and 1980, KCMSD's ratio of spending to average spending for
the group, was much higher than in 2000.
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TABLE 2
COMPARISONS OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI AND
MAJOR METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
Current Expenditure Instructional
Ratio to Other Large Expenditure Ratio to Poverty Ratio to Black Ratio to Other Number of Central
Year Cities Other Large Cities Other Large Cities Large Cities City Districts
1968 1.24[a] 142
1980 1.34[b] 123
1990 1.39 1.13 0.91 1.81 51
1991 1.56 1.29 0.94 1.82 51
1992 1.73 1.36 0.95 1.88 52
1993 1.50 1.16 0.91 1.84 51
1994 1.57 1.24 1.00 1.89 53
1995 1.76 1.38 1.42 2.15 78
1996 1.55 1.31 1.08 2.16 77
1997 1.37 1.18 1.23 2.18 77
1998 1.30 1.12 1.20 2.17 77
1999 1.14 1.02 1.26 2.13 69
2000 1.12 1.02 1.25 1.98 73
Districts in NCES Locale #1 with over 20,000 students in ADM
Primary Data Source. National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
[a] Elementary and Secondary Education General Information Survey, httpiJAvebapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoonAIAED-SERIES/00101.xml
[b] Elementary and Secondary Education General Information Survey, httpJAvebapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoorvlAED-SERIES/0101 .xml
Table 3 attempts to address whether KCMSD outspent for a decade
or more, all other major metropolitan districts, adjusting for regional cost
variations, using the 1993-94 National Center for Education Statistics
Geographic Cost of Education Index."' Data from 1990 to 2000 are
drawn from the same source used in Table 2. Data from 1968 and 1980
are drawn from an archived data set of the Elementary and Secondary
Education General Information Survey,"9' predecessor to the U.S. Census
Bureau's Fiscal Survey of Local Governments (F-33), Public Elementary
and Secondary School Finances. In 1968, KCMSD ranked 19th of 142
districts enrolling 30,000 or more pupils. Twelve years later, KCMSD
ranked 24th nationally in unadjusted dollars.
Table 3 shows that in either adjusted or unadjusted dollars, KCMSD
ranked first nationally for only one year, 1992. In most years, KCMSD
trailed Boston (MA), Rochester (NY), Pittsburg (PA), Portland (OR) or
Newark (NJ) school districts. By 2000, KCMSD had fallen to 19th of 73
districts, which was lower than it had been in 1968 when it was also
ranked 19th, but out of 142 school districts.
195. National Center for Education Statistics, EDUCATION FINANCE STATISTICS CEN-
TER, at http://www.nces.ed.gov/edfin/prodsurv/data.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2006).
196. International Archive of Education Data, ELEMErTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION
GENERAL INFORMATION SURVEY (ELSEGIS) SERIES, at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/
cocoon/IAED-SERIES/00101.xml (last visited Mar. 13,2006).
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TABLE 3
NATIONAL RANKING OF KANSAS CITY IN ADJUSTED AND
UNADJUSTED PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES
Kansas City Rank
Number Of Kansas City Rank (Current Expenditures
Year Districts In Group (Current Expenditures) Regionally Adjusted )
1968 142m 19
1980 123m 24
1990 511k1 7 4
1991 51 4 2
1992 52 1 1
1993 51 7 3
1997 77 6 4
2000 73 19 17
[a] All Districts With Greater Than 30,000 Students
[b] All Metropolitan Districts With Greater Than 20,000 Students
[c] Large Central City Metropolitan Districts With Greater Than 20,000 Students
[d] Natonal Center for Education Statistics Geographic Cost of Education Index (1993)
Kansas City has historically been considered a high spending metro-
politan school district. However, we find little or no evidence that
KCMSD outspent every other major metropolitan districts for over 10
years.
Next, we compare current operating and current instructional ex-
penditures of KCMSD with the other Kansas City Core Based Statistical
Area (CBSA) districts. Table 4 again, uses NCES/Census (F-33) data cou-
pled with earlier ELSEGIS data. Table 4 shows that KCMSD sometimes
spent as much as twice what other districts in the same metropolitan area
were spending. When focusing on instruction alone, that margin is cut to
only 58% above the other Kansas City metro area districts. As seen in
comparisons with national metropolitan areas, from 1995 to 2000,
KCMSD's funding margin tapered off quickly, and was only 23% above
metro average in current expenditures and only 9% above metro average
in instructional expenditures. Coupled with funding declines, pupil to
teacher ratios in KCSMD were higher than metro area averages by 1999.
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TABLE 4
RATIOS OF EXPENDITURES AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES
TO KC METRO AREA DISTRICTS
Ratio of
Ratio f Current Ratio of Current Ratio of Black Share Ratio f Ratio of Disabil- Pupil to
Expenditurea To Instructional Expendl- Poverty to to CMSA Hispanic Share Ity Share to Teacher Ratio
Year Cmna Mean lures to CMSA Mean CMSA Mean Mean to CMSA Mean CMSA Mean to CMSA Mean
1980 1.34
1990 1.77 1.32 2.91 6.73 2.33 1.08 0.84
1991 2.03 1.58 2.74 6.76 2.12 1.07 0.78
1992 2.20 1.58 2.53 6.72 2.13 1.07 0.77
1993 1.95 1.39 2.57 6.60 2.11 1.02 0.75
1994 1.99 1.45 2.57 6.34 2.21 0.99 0.76
1995 2.04 1.49 3.31 6.59 2.27 1.00 0.77
1996 1.73 1.38 2.27 6.43 2.49 1.04 0.80
1997 1.50 1.25 2.95 6.36 2.53 1.01 0.91
1998 1.43 1.20 2.95 6.19 2.62 0.89 0.98
1999 1.25 1.11 3.55 8.11 3.28 0.93 1.08
2000 1.23 1.09 3.48 5.52 2.62 0.81 1.04
2003 1.26
Table 5 and Table 6 attempt to compare KCMSD with the other
Kansas City metropolitan area districts when compared for need. This
method was not employed in the 1998 Cato Institute report. Due to the
lay of the land and historical patterns of housing segregation in the met-
ropolitan area, KCMSD had on average, six to eight times the black
population share; more than twice the Hispanic population share; and 2.5
to 3.5 times the poverty rate of KCMSD's metro area school district
counterparts. William Duncombe and John Yinger found that the addi-
tional cost per child qualifying for subsidized lunch was approximately
110% of the cost of achieving comparable outcomes for the non low in-
come child. 97 Following this work, and the application of these findings
for need adjustment by Robert Bifulco,198 we apply a weight of 1.10 to
each child qualifying for free or reduced price lunch as reported in the
NCES fiscal/non-fiscal longitudinal file (aggregated from the public
school universe enrollment data). Observe that we are unable to make
additional adjustments for the needs of limited English proficient students
due to insufficient or data on these students for the Missouri and Kansas
districts. Since our analyses adjust only for poverty-related needs, they
should be considered conservative.
Before adjustments are applied, KCMSD's instructional spending ra-
tios compared to other metro area districts climb to over 150% before
reducing to 108%. When adjusted for poverty-related needs only,
KCMSD rises only as high as 120% above other metro area districts, and
197. William Duncombe & John Yinger, How Much More Does a Disadvantaged Stu-
dent Cost?, 24 EcoN. EDUC. R.Ev. 513 (2005).
198. Robert Bifulco, District Level Black-Hhite Funding Disparities in the United States:
1987-2002, 31 J. EDUC. FIN. 1,2 (2005).
Urban Legends, Desegregation and School Finance
reduces to only 76% of other metro area districts by 2000. That is, by
2000, KCMSD actually shows an instructional spending deficit of 24%
relative to other districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area.
TABLE 5
INSTRUCTIONAL EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL IN KCMSD VERSUS
OTHER KANSAS CITY METRO DISTRICTS,
INCLUDING ADJUSTMENTS FOR STUDENT POVERTY
Instruction Not Adjusted for Need Instruction Adjusted for Need
Year CMSA KC KC % CMSA KC KC %
1990 $2,440 $3,163 130% $2,172 $2,211 102%
1991 $2,537 $3,894 153% $2,224 $2,651 119%
1992 $2,760 $4,197 152% $2,365 $2,828 120%
1993 $2,857 $3,788 133% $2,445 $2,530 104%
1994 $2,979 $4,143 139% $2,533 $2,693 106%
1995 $3,064 $4,426 144% $2,619 $2,598 99%
1996 $3,219 $4,325 134% $2,655 $2,764 104%
1997 $3,285 $4,036 123% $2,756 $2,429 88%
1998 $3,412 $3,986 117% $2,883 $2,425 84%
1999 $3,562 $3,845 108% $3,105 $2,333 75%
2000 $3,772 $4,091 108% $3,271 $2,477 76%
Enrollment>2,000 in ADM
Coot adjusted by applying weight of 1.10 per subsidized lunch pupil
Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
Table 6 replicates the analysis in Table 5 but with current operating
expenditures which fold in a portion of the pay-down of capital projects
associated with the judicially mandated "desegregative attractiveness" plan.
As indicated previously, before cost adjustments, KCMSD in the early
1990s spent twice as much as any other district in the Kansas City metro.
By 2000, that margin had declined to 18% above other districts. When
adjusted for poverty alone, however, spending peaked at 60% above other
districts in the Kansas City metro in 1992 and then declined rapidly to
only 83% of funding available in other districts by 2000.
In short, while spending peaked in the early 1990s at levels that
should have been more than sufficient for closing the achievement gaps
between average children and poor children (assuming conservatively, no
other systematically greater educational needs among KCMSD students
compared with other metro area students), that funding margin declined
and did so quite rapidly throughout the late 1990s. By the close of the
decade, KCMSD faced significant funding deficits relative to metro area
districts, after being adjusted for the cost of achieving comparable out-
comes.
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TABLE 6
CURRENT EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL IN KCMSD VERSUS OTHER KANSAS
CITY METRO DISTRICTS, INCLUDING ADJUSTMENTS FOR STUDENT POVERTY
Current Not Adjusted fur Need Current Adjusted for Need
Year CMSA KC KC % CMSA KC KC %
1990 $3,948 $6,557 166% $3,504 $4,584 131%
1991 $4,120 $7,867 191% $3,602 $5,357 149%
1992 $4,387 $8,926 203% $3,754 $6,016 160%
1993 $4,585 $8,211 179% $3,916 $5,486 140%
1994 $4,822 $8,809 183% $4,088 $5,725 140%
1995 $4,963 $9,436 190% $4,229 $5,538 131%
1996 $5,198 $8,495 163% $4,272 $5,429 127%
1997 $5,407 $7,688 142% $4,524 $4,626 102%
1998 $5,656 $7,676 136% $4,766 $4,669 98%
1999 $5,929 $7,093 120% $5,155 $4,304 83%
2000 $6,301 $7,449 118% $5,450 $4,510 83%
Enrollment>2,000 in ADM
Cost adjusted by applying weight of 1.10 per subsidized lunch pupil (See Bifulco, 2005)
Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
B. Premise #2: Did the KCMSD Desegregation Plan Prove
That Spending Large Sums on Predominantly
Minority Schools Is Inefficient?
Conservative critics of school finance litigation argue that because
the long-term and "excessive" spending of the KCMSD desegregation
plan did not lead to improvement in educational outcomes, the plan
serves as the "poster child" for demonstrating why spending large sums on
predominantly black schools is unproductive and inefficient.
The logic of this evaluation framework is deeply flawed for three
reasons. First, we have shown that KCMSD was a very high spending dis-
trict for only five years, and that when adjusted for student needs,
KCMSD was already below average in its metropolitan area by 1998. Co-
incidentally, it was not until 1998 that Missouri implemented its current
and first statewide system of outcome assessment. It would be difficult if
not impossible to evaluate the effects of funding that no-longer existed on
outcomes that were not yet being measured.
Second, it is important to keep in mind that the primary goal of the
KCMSD desegregation plan was to increase the "desegregative attractive-
ness" of the school district. Accordingly, Judge Clark did not target the
additional educational spending on remedies, such as reducing class sizes
in grades K-319 or improving the quality of the district's teachers, 2°°
199. Frederick Mosteller, 7he Tennessee Study of Class Size in the Early School Grades, 5
THE FUTURE OF CHILD.: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHILD. &YouTHS 113 (1995).
200. Charles Clotfelter, Teacher Quality and Minority Achievement Gaps, TERRY SANFORD
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC POLICY, at http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/people/faculty/clotfelter/
SAN04-04.pdf#search=%22%22teacherO/o20quality%/ 20and%20minority% 20achievement%/
20gaps%22%22 (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
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which might have reduced the district's racial achievement gap. Therefore,
because of the limited goals of the KCMSD desegregation plan, the les-
sons of the Jenkins case are of limited applicability to school finance
litigation.
Third, as we have shown, KCMSD remained predominantly black
after plan implementation. Therefore, because the KCMSD plan failed to
achieve substantive racial integration, it provides little or no evidence re-
garding the effectiveness of racial integration in improving outcomes.
Instead, the best way to determine whether KCMSD was inefficient
is to evaluate the district when it had achieved unitary status. Importantly,
efficiency is a purely relative concept. One cannot say whether a local
public school district is efficient in production of student outcomes by
evaluating that district alone. Rather, one must evaluate the district's ex-
penditures and outcomes in the context of other districts attempting to
achieve similar outcomes.
Further, one must attempt to control for factors outside district con-
trol, such as student population characteristics, which affect student
outcomes and the cost of improving student outcomes. Similarly, schools
and districts may have to pay different prices for their inputs, even if those
inputs are of similar quality. For example, schools in one location com-
pared with schools in another might have to pay substantially different
wages to recruit and retain teachers with similar qualifications.
In this section, we explore the relative productive and cost efficien-
cies of KCMSD. We focus our comparisons herein on districts in the
Kansas City metropolitan area. Productive efficiency evaluates whether,
given their current resource levels, regional costs, and student population
characteristics, school districts produce student outcomes that meet ex-
pectations. Cost efficiency evaluates the expected costs of achieving
current outcome levels, given student population differences.
We estimate technical efficiency of production and cost efficiency of
Missouri's scale efficient public school districts, enrolling over 2,000 stu-
dents. We focus on scale efficient districts-districts large enough to enjoy
economies of scale and are large enough to have enough annual test tak-
ers to yield more reliable year to year performance outcomes.
Productive efficiency estimation places student outcome measure-
ment as a dependent variable. The district's Missouri Assessment Program
(MAP) Index score is the dependent variable. The productive efficiency
estimation may include a lagged measure of the outcome variable. We
apply models both with, and without the lagged performance measure.
We specify our model as follows:
MAP = b0 + bMAP,1  + b2Year + b3CurexpADA +
b4Enrollment + b5Enrollment 2 + b6FRLunch + b7Black +
b8Disability + bTeachCost + e
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MAP represents each district's MAP index score; MAP, equals the
1 period lagged MAP index score (used in one set of models);Year repre-
sents the year of the data, where the data set includes data from 2000 to
2005; CurexpADA represents the districts' current expenditures per stu-
dent in average daily attendance; Enrollment represents the district total
enrollment (and enrollment squared); FRLunch represents the percent of
children receiving free or reduced price lunch; Black represents the dis-
trict percent black; Disability represents the district percent of children in
special education programs; and TeachCost represents the relative cost of
hiring a teacher at specific degree level and years of experience in each
U.S. Census Core Based Statistical Area across Missouri (compared to ru-
ral outlying areas). 20 1
Cost efficiency estimation makes districts' current expenditures the
dependent variable in an education cost function. Costs are assumed to be
a function of current outcome levels student population characteristics,
district structural characteristics and geographic variations in the prices of
schooling inputs.
CurexpADA = b0 + b1MAP + b2 MAP,_, + b3Year ++ 2
b4Enrollment +b5Enrollment + b6FreeLunch + brBlack +
b8Disability + b7TeachCost + e
CurexpADA is now the dependent variable and student outcomes (MAP)
and lagged outcomes are the independent (though endogenous) variables.
The two broad categories of empirical methods for investigating
school or district efficiency are regression based methods (Corrected Or-
dinary Least Squares and Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and numerical
maximization methods (Data Envelopment Analysis). 202 Unfortunately,
recent research suggests that district inefficiency is difficult to measure
with great precision and accuracy, regardless of empirical method.213
201. Estimated via a Core Based Statistical Area fixed effects model using teacher
level data on about 62,000 to 65,000 teachers per year from 1998 to 2005 across the state
of Missouri.The model was specified as: Wage = f(year, degree level, experience, CBSA).
202. Timothy J. Gronberg & Dennis Jansen, Navigating Newly Chartered Waters: An
Analysis of Texas Charter School Performance, TExAs PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION (2001);
Steven C. Deller & Edward Rudnicki, Production Efficiency in Elementary Education: The Case
of Maine Public Schools, 12 ECON. EDUC. REv. 45 (1993); Authella Bessent & E. Wailand
Bessent, Determining the Comparative Efficiency of Schools through Data Envelopment Analysis,
16 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 57 (1980); John Ruggiero, Efficiency and Educational Production: An
Analysis of New York School Districts, 78 REv. ECON. & STATS. 499 (1996).
203. Robert Bifulco & William Duncombe, Evaluating School Performance: Are We
Ready for Prime Time?, in DVELOPMENTS IN SCHOOL FINANCE, 1999-2000 (2000); Robert
Bifulco & Stewart Bretschneider, Estimating School Efficiency: A Comparison of Methods Using
Simulated Data, 20 ECON. EDUC. REv. 417 (2001).
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With this caveat in mind, we apply the Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) to estimate the technical efficiency of production and cost effi-
ciency. SFA decomposes the residual difference between predicted cost
and actual spending of the cost function into two components-a ran-
dom error term and cost inefficiency term. SFA fits a frontier model, or
model across the most cost efficient (or productive efficient) districts in
the sample as opposed to a model of average efficiency. SFA requires the
researcher to specify the distribution of the random error term. This is
most often assumed to be normal/half-normal because districts cannot
exceed maximum efficiency.
Statistical software packages including Stata 9.0 produce estimates of
relative cost or technical efficiency. Cost efficiency estimates will assign a
100% cost efficient district a value of 1.0, with less efficient districts (i.e.
those having larger residuals after removing the error term), receiving
higher values. Productive efficiency indices also assign a value of 1.0 for
perfect (100%) efficiency, but then express as decimals, reductions to 100%
efficiency. For clarity, we also compare predicted performance levels with
actual performance levels, and predicted cost levels with actual levels.
Table 7 summarizes key variables over school districts in the Kansas
City, Missouri Core Based Statistical Area. Table 8 summarizes the pre-
dicted and actual cost and performance levels of Kansas City area
(Missouri only) districts, including efficiency indices for alternative mod-
els. Districts are sorted from least to most cost efficient (last column). Two
emerging minority population districts, Grandview and Center school
districts, appear less efficient than KCMSD. Center School district, origi-
nally founded as a post-Brown segregated enclave, is now approaching
black concentration levels of KCMSD. It is spending more per pupil than
KCMSD and is predicted to need less per pupil to achieve its current
level of outcomes. As such, the inefficiency margin for Center is greater
than that of KCMSD. In productive efficiency, without a lagged perform-
ance measure, Center is slightly more efficient than KCMSD, at 97.7% as
compared to 97.0%. Grandview is less cost efficient and less productive
efficient than KCMSD. Indeed the Grandview's MAP index of 176 is
higher than KCMSD's 161. Grandview's $9,594 expenditure per ADA is
also higher than KCMSD's $8,020 expenditure per ADA.
On productive efficiency, excluding lagged performance (Which
removes most existing variance), several districts miss their predicted mark
by wider margins than KCMSD. These include Belton, Excelsior Springs,
Raymore-Peculiar, Raytown and Hickman Mills. Grandview, Excelsior
Springs and Hickman Mills were also identified as marginally less efficient
than other districts in the model including lagged performance.
Needless to say, even in its own metropolitan area, KCMSD is not
necessarily an inefficiency standout. As such, it is difficult to believe that
KCMSD during its last five year, is an appropriate national model for in-
efficient school district expenditure. Note that Hickman Mills' raw
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performance outcomes are only marginally better than those of KCMSD,
despite serving far fewer impoverished children, but a similar black con-
centration.
TABLE 7
DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE
KANSAS CITY CORE BASED STATISTICAL AREA
(2000 TO 2004 AVERAGES)
Percent SubsI-
District dized Lunch Percent Black Percent Disability Enrollment
KEARNEY R-I 5.7% 0.5% 11.6% 3195
BLUE SPRINGS R-IV 9.1% 5.2% 11.8% 12716
ODESSAR-VII 25.5% 1.9% 13.4% 2337
PLATTE CO. R-Il 13.6% 3.6% 10.9% 2171
RAYTOWN C-2 30.7% 29.7% 11.7% 8461
LEE'S SUMMIT R-VII 7.7% 5.6% 12.3% 14597
NORTH KANSAS CITY 74 24.0% 6.1% 14.4% 16940
HICKMAN MILLS -1 52.7% 69.3% 14.7% 7392
RAYMORE-PECULIAR R-II 12.7% 2.8% 8.5% 4455
HARRISONVILLE R-IX 22.2% 1.2% 10.3% 2338
PARK HILL 13.1% 6.1% 14.1% 9165
BELTON 124 26.9% 5.0% 11.5% 4594
FORT OSAGE R-I 32.2% 4.9% 16.8% 4845
EXCELSIOR SPRINGS 40 26.4% 2.5% 11.5% 2975
LIBERTY 53 11.6% 4.0% 11.2% 7087
INDEPENDENCE 30 34.5% 5.4% 15.7% 11198
KANSAS CITY 33 76.8% 69.7% 11.5% 30272
GRANDVIEW C-4 41.6% 49.9% 12.9% 4222
CENTER 58 52.1% 57.9% 15.2% 2594
TABLE 8
ALTERNATIVE RANKINGS OF COST-EFFICIENCY
Predicted Actual
Predicted Productive Current Current
Predicted MAP MAP Index Actual Productive Efficiency Expend per Expend per Cost Effi-
District Index (lag) MAP Index Efficiency (lagged MAP) ADA ADA ciency
CENTER 58 183.12 177.36 177.21 0.977210 0.999848 $6,905 $9,676 1.356
GRANDVIEW 189.37 177.84 176.08 0.963534 0.999847 $5,992 $8,020 1.314
C-4
KANSAS CITY 33 171.03 162.17 161.87 0.970443 0.999848 $7,148 $9,594 1.310
INDEPENDENCE30 200.10 193.64 192.64 0.976100 0.999848 $5,478 $7,324 1297
LIBERTY 53 213.37 207.08 207.42 0.978719 0.999848 $5,281 $6,780 1.271
EXCELSIOR 203.63 189.74 187.54 0.959418 0.999847 $4,715 $6,082 1265
SPRINGS 40
FORTOSAGE 199.53 191.49 189.98 0.972588 0.999848 $5,351 $6,918 1.257
R-I
BELTON 124 203.23 189.39 189.23 0.964364 0.999848 $4,749 $5,966 1.254
PARK HILL 210.94 205.98 205.88 0.979757 0.999848 $5,723 $7,294 1248
HARRISONVILLE R- 205.84 197.95 198.03 0.975767 0.999848 $5,008 $6,199 1.220
IX
RAYMORE- 211.89 196.64 196.39 0.962522 0.999848 $4,622 $5,697 1.207
PECULIAR -II
HICKMAN MILLS C-1 179.29 184.84 162.89 0.954032 0.999847 $6,376 $7,756 1.197
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Predicted Actual
Predicted Productive Current Current
Predicted MAP MAP Index Actual Productive Efficiency Expend per Expend per Cost Effi-
District Index (lag) MAP Index Efficiency (lagged MAP) ADA ADA ciency
NORTH KANSAS 203.86 195.92 195.54 0.974919 0.999848 $5,765 $6,999 1.196
CITY 74
LEES SUMMIT R-VII 213.29 209.71 209.49 0.981265 0.999848 $5,908 $6,925 1.169
RAYTOWN C-2 197.07 187.12 186.05 0.969726 0.999848 $5,538 $6,487 1.165
PLATTE CO. R-Ill 208.44 201.96 203.14 0.979212 0.999848 $5,374 $6,240 1.156
ODESSA R-VII 200.77 192.05 190.79 0.971681 0.999848 $5,180 $5,815 1.140
BLUE SPRINGS R-IV 212.31 209.13 209.15 0.981928 0.999848 $5,683 $6,442 1.137
KEARNEY R-I 210.79 200.70 200.89 0.972545 0.999848 $5,097 $5,182 1.077
We acknowledge that these analyses were conducted over a period
where KCMSD's relative spending position had sunk to lower than its
relative position in 1968 and much lower than 1993.Thus, it is likely that
KCMSD's current productive and cost efficiency rankings are better than
they might have been if estimated from 1992 to 1995. However, while
spending peaked at relatively high levels during this period, it is difficult
to conceive that student outcomes could be substantially positively af-
fected, at whatever level of spending, in the time it takes for one cohort of
students to move from the 2nd to the 5th grade.
C. Premise #3: Did the State of Missouri Cover a Disproportionate Share
of the Costs of the Desegregation Plan?
In this empirical analysis, we address whether the state of Missouri
covered most of the costs of the KCMSD desegregation plan. We begin
with a discussion of the additional annual operating aid raised through the
state school finance formula. We conclude with a brief analysis of total
revenues per pupil in KCMSD, including additional capital funds raised
for new construction and renovation, a centerpiece of the desegregation
plan and flashpoint for the conservative critique.
Missouri has long used a matching aid formula to distribute state
revenues to local school districts. State aid for general operating budgets is
pegged primarily to the local tax rate adopted by local voters through
direct referenda. As previously discussed, matching aid ratios are deter-
mined by the ratio of each district's taxable assessed property value per
pupil compared to the state guaranteed assessed valuation per pupil. If a
district's own assessed value per pupil is approximately 50% of the state
guarantee, that district would receive in state aid, $1 for each dollar raised
from local property taxes. An additional multiplier was added in the 199 0s
to adjust matching aid amounts by differences in district income. In addi-
tion, student need adjustments were added. Nonetheless, the primary
determinant of total state and local revenue per pupil above and beyond
that generated by a $1.25 rate (early 1990s) or $2.75 rate (later 1990s to
present) is the tax rate approved by local voters, or in the case of Kansas
City, the tax rate mandated by Judge Clark.
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Also as previously discussed, despite concurrent state school finance
litigation and subsequent modifications to the state school finance system
(most notably, increasing the minimum tax rate and including poverty
based adjustments to aid), no significant structural changes were made to
the Missouri school finance formula until 2005. Rather, just as Judge
Clark chose to work within the perceived constraints of the Milliken deci-
sions, state legislators also chose to work within the constraints of existing
state school finance policies. By raising KCMSD's local tax rate to $4.95,
KCMSD would generate $7,425 per pupil in state and local revenue be-
fore income and student need adjustment rather than the minimum
$4,125. At a 50% matching rate (close to that of KCMSD), this would
generate $126 million in total state aid per year (.5 x 7,425 = 3,713 x
34,000 students = 126,225,000) or about $63 million more than would
have been generated at the late 1990s minimum tax of $2.75.
Table 9 summarizes local revenue per pupil generated by KCMSD's
actual court imposed tax rate compared with what the district would have
raised locally had it only been required to levy the current state average
tax rate from 1999 to 2003. KCMSD residents were forced to raise
$1,200 to $1,300 more per pupil than if they had imposed the state aver-
age local tax rate.
TABLE 9
ASSESSED VALUE PER PUPIL, OPERATING LEVIES AND LocAL REVENUE
UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
Assessed Value per Pupil Operating Levy Local Revenue per Pupil
KC at Average
Year Non-KC KC Non-KC KC KC at Current Non-KC Levy
1999 $ 59,421 $ 65,121 3.21 4.60 2,996 2,090
2000 $ 63,586 $ 68,687 3.24 4.95 3,400 2,222
2001 $66,122 $ 72,027 3.27 4.95 3,565 2,352
2002 $ 72,049 $ 77,762 3.28 4.95 3,849 2,551
2003 $73,768 $75,186 3.34 4.95 3,722 2,508
As seen in Table 9, KCMSD has a slightly stronger than average
property tax base, meaning that on average, KCMSD residents pay a
higher share of school revenue than districts statewide. Table 10 summa-
rizes current expenditures per pupil, local revenue per pupil and local
revenue shares of current expenditures for all Missouri school districts.
On average, while KCMSD had a much higher current operating expen-
ditures per pupil than other districts statewide, KCMSD residents also
paid a larger share of the total cost. Indeed, by the basic structure of the
Missouri aid formula, their larger share was warranted.
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TABLE 10
CURRENT EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL AND LOCAL REVENUE SHARES
Local Revenue p r Pupil Current Expenditures p r Pupil Share of Current Expenditures
Year Non-KC KC Non-KC KC Non-KC Share KC-Share
1999 $1,920 $2,996 $5,269 $7,199 36.4% 41.6%
2000 $2,063 $ 3,400 $5,616 $7,680 36.7% 44.3%
2001 $2,165 $3,565 $6,008 $8,642 36.0% 41.3%
2002 $2,357 $ 3,849 $6,388 $9,494 36.9% 40.5%
2003 $2,460 $3,722 $ 6,622 $8,659 37.1% 43.0%
Table 11 reveals one final feature of Missouri's existing school fi-
nance formula that leads to substantial reductions in aid to KCMSD
relative to other districts statewide. Missouri is among a handful of states
that continues to provide aid to local public school districts on the basis
of their average daily attendance (ADA) rather than by enrolled pupil
count or membership. From 2000 to 2004, poverty rates and black stu-
dent population share alone explain 59% of variations in attendance rates
across Missouri school districts enrolling over 2,000 students. Both black
population share and poverty rate are strongly associated with lower at-
tendance rates, leading to systematically lower funding per eligible or
enrolled pupil in districts with higher shares of either population. Table 9
shows that, in 1999, while districts on average (excluding KCMSD) lost
5.6% of state aid due to differences between enrollment and ADA,
KCMSD lost nearly 13%. That margin has decreased after KCMSD had
improved its attendance rates. Nonetheless, KCMSD continues to receive
a lower share of state aid due to ADA based funding, than other districts
with lower poverty rates and smaller black populations.
TABLE II
FUNDING REDUCTION EFFECT OF PROVIDING AID ON THE BASIS
OF AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE
State Revenue p r ADA State Revenue p r Pupil % Loss due to ADA Count
Year Non-KC KC Non-KC KC Non-KC KC
1999 $2,103 $4,065 $1,986 $3,539 5.6% 12.9%
2000 $2.216 $3,473 $2,081 $ 3,118 6.1% 10.2%
2001 $2,367 $3,895 $2,226 $3,594 6.0/ 7.7%
2002 $2,408 $3,924 $2,289 $ 3,633 4.9% 7.4%
2003 $ 2,466 $2,690 $2,369 $2,737
Adopting the logic of the federal district court in Missouri, many
modern school finance adequacy problems would be resolved by simply
requiring high need, inadequately funded urban districts, to increase
property taxes so that they cover all the costs of achieving adequate out-
comes on their own. Perhaps the most obvious extension of this logic
applies to the proposed $5 billion price tag for the State of New York to
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resolve school funding inadequacies in New York City, which enrolls over
1/3 of that state's students.
Some argue that KCMSD has a large enough non-residential tax
base and large enough number of high income residents to handle a local
property tax hike without putting an unreasonable burden on the dis-
trict's low-income residents. Indeed, the commercial and industrial tax
base and wealth of families without children in KCMSD schools does
provide some support. Nonetheless, in 2003, the median voter (in a hous-
ing unit of median value and with median household income) in
Missouri already paid 1.25% of income in school operating tax levy. In
the 95 percentile district, the median voter paid 1.75% and in KCMSD,
1.85%.
Arguably, the judicial imposition of KCMSD's elevated tax rate has
inhibited the district from initiating funding inadequacy claims against the
state, or achieving sufficient legislative sympathy to lead to favorable
school finance reform absent litigation. Common public misperceptions
are that (1) KCMSD is flush with financial resources; and (2) KCMSD has
garnered, for the past 25 years, a disproportionate and unfair share of state
resources.Yet, neither claim is true. As indicated previously, in recent years,
KCMSD's resource margin has all but disappeared, and when adjusting for
need, KCMSD faces a significant resource deficit relative to other districts
in the Kansas City metro area. Second, KCMSD has paid the same share
of its state and local revenues as would any other district in the state of
similar taxable wealth, income and poverty, with similar tax rate. Indeed,
with its higher tax rate and overall size, the district does consume a sig-
nificant share of the state's education funding. The same, however, can be
said of some of the state's larger suburban school districts that have taken
advantage of matching grant aid for levies above the $2.75 rate and have
done so at a rapidly increasing pace in recent years.
Figure 2 addresses the state share of total revenues per pupil for
KCMSD, relative to the rest of the state of Missouri, through the 1990s.
The facilities plan component of the Jenkins remedies came at a total cost
of around $540 million."4 To contextualize that number, first consider that
new school facilities or substantially renovated ones should last for ap-
proximately 30 years. As such, the value of the $540 million may spread
out to about $18 million per year. Across about 30,000 students per year,
that value comes to about $600 per pupil, or about 5% of per pupil reve-
nues in peak years. As such, while $540 million sounds like a great deal of
money, in reality, it equates to a modest and practical funding allocation.
With the short-term increase in total revenue, including revenue for
capital projects, the state's share of total revenue in KCMSD climbed to
between 50% and 55% during peak years (1992 to 1998). By 2000, the
state share had dipped back below 45%. During that period, the district's
204. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 78.
[VOL. 12:57
Urban Legends, Desegregation and School Finance
total annual revenue ranged from about $320 to $450 million. If the ex-
pected share to be covered by the state was closer to 40% instead of 55%,
in the peak year of revenue generating, the state share would have been
$180 million (40% x $450 million). At 55% the state share of $450 million
would be $247.5 million, or 67.5 million more than expected. If divided
evenly across the state's 867,000 students in 1996 (only K-12 districts), it
would amount to about $78 per pupil and could have been spent on all
Missouri children rather than KCMSD children, or approximately 1.3%
over the average district level total revenue per pupil in that year ($5,866).
That is, measured very generously, increased allocations of state support to
KCMSD above and beyond the expected state share absent Jenkins reme-
dies, resulted in a potential decrease of statewide funding by about 1.3%
per pupil. It is conceivable, though unlikely that this 1.3% difference,
never promised to districts statewide, could have been sufficient to rein-
state some of the cancelled field trips and extra-curricular activities that
other districts claimed had been eliminated because of the state's ob-
ligations to KCMSD.
FIGURE 2
PERCENT OF TOTAL REVENUE FROM STATE SOURCES
IN MISSOURI AND IN KCMSD
60%
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D. Summarizing the Empirical Critique
Contrary to the assertions of conservative critics, it turns out that
KCMSD outspent all other major metropolitan districts in only one
year-1992-based on either unadjusted or regionally cost adjusted
analysis of either current operating expenditures or current instructional
expenditures per pupil. While spending peaked at 76% above average
(1995) for those districts, by 2000, KCMSD spent only 12% above aver-
age in current operating expenditures and only 2% above average in
instructional expenditures. That is, peak funding lasted for a relatively
short period of time. Relative to schools in the Kansas City metropolitan
area, the spending edge was approximately 2 to 1 over the average during
the early 1990s. Again, by 2000 that margin had declined substantially to
only 23% above average in current expenditures and only 9% above aver-
age in instructional expenditures. When adjusted for poverty related need,
KCMSD had only 83% of average current expenditures and only 76% of
average instructional expenditures among large districts in its metropoli-
tan area.
Also, the claim of conservative critics of school finance litigation
that Jenkins demonstrates that there is no correlation between increased
educational resources and improved educational outcomes is flawed for
three reasons. First, KCMSD was a high spending district for a relatively
short time. Second, the primary focus of KCMSD desegregation plan was
to increase desegregation. Therefore, in Jenkins, the court did not target
funding on strategies which may have had a better chance of improving
minority outcomes. Third, the KCMSD plan cannot even be used to es-
tablish that desegregation will not lead to improved outcomes because the
district remained majority black throughout the period of judicial over-
sight. Indeed, our empirical analysis shows that KCMSD is neither the
most, nor the least efficient district in the immediate metropolitan area,
much less the entire state. Thus, the district is not the "poster child" for
the proposition that no correlation exists between increased spending and
improved educational outcomes.
Finally, despite the regional belief that the financial woes of all other
school districts in out-state Missouri are primarily a function of dispro-
portionate sums of state resources allocated specifically to KCMSD, the
district's property taxpayers consistently paid a much higher share of the
district's state and local operating revenue than other districts across the
state. Further, the effects of redistributing statewide additional state reve-
nues awarded to KCMSD would have been relatively small ($78 per pupil
at the highest).
It is necessary to ask how the premises upon which the conservative
critique is based could be so distorted. The first problem is that the con-
servative critique fails to take into account the history of KCMSD and
the state of Missouri. We have observed that the residential structure and
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demographics of KCMSD were carefully crafted by city officials and real
estate developers into racially segregated enclaves for the first 60 years of
the 20th century. We have also noted that in the 1960s, KCMSD was a
relatively high spending district, but because of the school funding sys-
tem's reliance on property taxation and KCMSD's racial and socio-
economic composition, the district would soon be unable to meet its
educational needs. Moreover, we explained that Judge Clark responded to
KCMSD's financial concerns in the Jenkins litigation by imposing an ex-
tremely high property tax rate on the district. We have further explained
that the state legislature adopted the court-imposed tax rate to settle the
KCMSD desegregation suit and that this high tax burden became part of
the state school finance formula.
When considering these factors, it is easy to understand how by
2000, KCMSD was in its weakest relative position in school funding since
prior to the 1960s. It is also easy to understand that the Jenkins litigation
only temporarily shifted KCMSD's relative funding levels compared with
either a national peer group of metropolitan districts or a local labor mar-
ket peer group. Moreover, it becomes clear that because of KCMSD's
disproportionate tax burden, district residents have shouldered a higher
tax burden than residents of other Missouri school districts.
The second flaw with the conservative critique is that fails to pro-
vide a context for the funds spent on the KCMSD desegregation plan.
Critics cite the statistics that claim KCMSD spent more than $11,000 per
pupil and that $2 billion were spent on the desegregation plan as evidence
of exorbitant spending. When taken out of context, these numbers appear
huge. However, our analysis reveals that KCMSD was a very high spend-
ing district for no more than five years, or the time in which one cohort
of children is able to progress through five grade levels in the district. Fur-
ther, when adjusted for student needs, KCMSD's funding dropped below
the metropolitan area average by 1998.This is hardly enough time to erase
the generational poverty of KCMSD or alter the residential structure and
demographics of a school district that had been designed to be racially
segregated until the 1960s.
CONCLUSIONS
In school finance litigation, a number of courts have held that there
is a correlation between educational funding and educational outcomes.
Conservative critiques have asserted that the KCMSD desegregation case
clearly establishes that no such correlation exists. Their critique is based
on three premises: (1) KCMSD received more money over an extended
period than other school districts; (2) the state of Missouri covered a dis-
proportionate share of the costs of the desegregation plan, to the
detriment of school districts throughout the rest of the state; and (3) the
exorbitant spending on KCMSD was largely inefficient, leading to no
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improvement in educational outcomes. However, our empirical analysis
does not support these claims. Thus, KCMSD experience should not be
cited as proof that "money doesn't matter" with respect to academic out-
comes.There are two reasons for this lack of support: (1) the conservative
critique fails to consider the educational history of the state of Missouri
and KCMSD; and (2) the critique analyzes spending out of context.
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APPENDIX A
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES AND STOCHASTIC FRONTIER
EFFICIENCY REGRESSIONS MODELS UNDERLYING PREDICTED
VALUES & EFFICIENCY ESTIMATES IN TABLE II
TABLE AI
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY MODEL WITHOUT LAGGED PERFORMANCE
OLS SFA
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Year
2001 -0.014 0.005 0.003 -0.014 0.004 0.002
2002 -0.014 0.005 0.002 -0.014 0.005 0.002
2003 -0.008 0.005 0.116 -0.007 0.005 0.120
2004 0.000 0.005 0.941 0.001 0.005 0.877
Current Spending
per ADA (In) 0.079 0.010 0.000 0.080 0.010 0.000
Enrollment (In) 0.164 0.047 0.001 0.168 0.047 0.000
Enrollment (in)




Lunch -0.218 0.015 0.000 -0.220 0.015 0.000
Percent Black -0.127 0.012 0.000 -0.125 0.012 0.000
Percent Disability -0.371 0.022 0.000 -0.375 0.022 0.000
CBSA Teacher
Wage Fixed Effect -0.104 0.017 0.000 -0.104 0.016 0,000
Intercept 4.113 0.244 0.000 4.103 0.242 0.000
R-squared 0.806
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TABLE A2
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY MODELS WITH LAGGED PERFORMANCE
OLS SFA
Coal. Std. Err. P>t Coal. Std. Err. P>z
MAP Index Lagged 1
Period (In) 0.893 0.029 0.000 0.893 0.029 0.000
Year
2001 -0.014 0.003 0.000 -0.010 0.002 0.000
2002 -0.004 0.003 0.104 0.006 0.002 0.011
2003 0.002 0.003 0.409
2004 0.004 0.003 0.098
Current Spending per
ADA (In) 0.007 0.007 0.297 0.007 0.007 0.289
Enrollrent (In) 0.024 0.030 0.412 0.024 0.029 0.405
Enrollment (In)
Squared -0.001 0.002 0.445 0.001 0.002 0.438
Demographics
Percent
Free/Reduced Lunch -0.018 0.011 0.119 -0.018 0.011 0.113
Percent Black -0.017 0.008 0.042 -0.017 0.008 0.038
Percent Disability -0.023 0.018 0.206 -0.023 0.018 0.199
CBSA Teacher Wage
Fixed Effect -0.006 0.011 0.581 -0.006 0.011 0.575




Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coal. Std. Err. P>z
MAP Index (In) 0.379 0.363 0297 0.431 0.337
MAP Index Lagged
1 Period (In) 0.980 0.384 0.011 0.702 0.360
Enrollment (In) -1.243 0.208 0.000 -1.204 0.207
Enrollment (In)




Lunch -0.089 0.083 0.284 -0.076 0.077
Percent Black 0.708 0.050 0.000 0.629 0.050
Percent Disability 2.251 0.069 0.000 2.246 0.072
CBSA Teacher
Wage Fixed Effect 0.223 0.080 0.006 0.130 0.070
Year
2001 -0.087 0.019 0.000 -0.055 0.017 0.001
2002 -0.028 0.019 0.139
2003 0.008 0.018 0.674 0.032 0.017 0.059
2004 0.024 0.017 0.163
Intercept 6.385 1.386 0.000 7.303 1.365 0.000
R-squared 0.852
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TABLE A3
COST EFFICIENCY MODELS
